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Abstract. Economic development process implies, among other things, export expansion beyond natural 
resources and towards more knowledge intensive sectors. However, a common problem within develo-
ping countries is the lack of economic and political elite´s ‘entrepreneurial push’ in order to diversify 
such exports. The Chilean economy is not an exception as its export basket is still characterized as 
being anchored in natural resources. This feature has persisted despite the prevailing consensus on the 
importance of diversifying the economy towards new industrial and service sectors, both beyond and 
within natural resources. This paper focuses on the causes of the absence of such an ‘entrepreneurial 
push’, looking into the failure of the development of a services export sector in the country. Through a 
qualitative exploratory analysis of elite´s perceptions, we study the predominant hypothesis among key 
stakeholders. We argue that the rentier character of the economic elite and the lack of State support for 
productive transformation are the main causes of both Chile’s export stagnation and the incapacity to 
diversify towards more knowledge intensive sectors such as services.
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I. Introduction
Economic development refers, in a broad sense, to the process through which a country 
moves aggregate resources from sectors with low economic dynamism and technolog-
ical spillover (e.g. labour-intensive industries, natural resources sectors, etc.) to sectors 
with high technological dynamism (e.g. manufacture, modern services, etc.) (Amsden, 
2001). This process differs widely from mere economic growth as development neces-
sarily implies an innovation process towards building new economic sectors, markets, 
productive processes and organisational structures (Schumpeter, 2017 [1934]). Un-
questionably, as Schumpeter reminded us, this process is never given, as it requires eco-
nomic agents’ specific characteristics such as high creative capacities and low risk-aver-
sion to carry this process on, which he defined as ‘entrepreneurship’.
At the same time, as classic developmentalism has shown, the process of structural 
change and innovation faces inherent problems related to a series of market failures such 
as coordination failures, positive externalities and factor immobility (Cypher & Diez, 
2004). These situations indicate that, together with economic agents’ ‘entrepreneurial 
spirit’, development also requires the active State involvement in order to solve those fail-
ures. This requires the State to be in a constant dialogue with economic agents in order to 
identify the traps and support the risks involved in the innovation process (Evans, 1995). 
Therefore, economic development process requires business elite participation 
through the control of private investment and State elite participation, through the 
control of the public apparatus. Both elites have the power in modern societies to 
shape the economic growth pattern and determine countries development possibili-
ties (Stiglitz, 2016). However, the typical situation in developing countries is the lack 
of that ‘entrepreneurial push’ in both the State and business. How can we explain this 
lack of resource-mobilization capacity? Following Schumpeter (2008 [1943]), one key 
economic problem is to explain why elites sometimes passively adapt to existing pro-
ductive order, while in other situations they actively change it. In this last instance, what 
is the relationship between elites and economic development? 
This question is particularly relevant to understand the stagnation of Chile’s eco-
nomic diversification. Chile’s productive and export baskets are anchored in natural 
resources, where mineral extraction (i.e. copper) is the most important economic ac-
tivity, followed by other low value-added sectors such as agriculture, fishing and forest-
ry. Nowadays, there is consensus in the political system regarding the importance of 
diversifying the Chilean economy for its long-term sustainability, moving its pattern 
of specialisation towards new industrial and service sectors, both beyond and within 
natural resources (Direcon, 2009; Atria et al., 2015; Velasco & Brieba, 2019). There-
fore, diversification and added value to Chilean exports has been identified as a political 
priority by the various administrations since the return of democracy in the 1990s, with 
a particular emphasis on the development of a services industry that may complement 
the existing natural resources sectors (Prochile, 2017).
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However, despite the political discourse, Chile continues to show a highly con-
centrated export basket, and most programmes focused on the development of new 
productive sectors, especially in services, have failed to achieve their objectives. Many 
hypotheses have been raised within the academia in order to comprehend these fail-
ures, including the neutrality approach towards economic growth, problems in public 
policies design and/or the inherent inefficiencies in trying to move resources beyond 
the static comparative advantages (OECD, 2011). This paper presents an analysis of 
the hypothesis coming from the main stakeholders in both the public and private sec-
tors in Chile. Through an exhaustive exploratory qualitative analysis, this paper argues 
that for the majority of the stakeholders considered, the rentier character of the eco-
nomic elite and the lack of State support for productive transformation are the main 
causes of both Chile’s export stagnation and the incapacity to diversify towards more 
knowledge intensive sectors such as services. These interpretations are consistent with 
contemporary literature on the political economy of development, particularly the 
one that has emerged as a result of the heterodox and developmentalist interpreta-
tions of the East Asian miracle (see Wade, 1990; Amsden, 1992; Chang, 2006) and 
the new studies on collective technological innovation and the entrepreneurial State 
(Mazzucato, 2004). 
This paper is relevant not only to increase our understanding of Chile’s current sit-
uation, but also to shed some light on similar problems that other countries of the re-
gion are facing. The lack of export diversification and the stagnation into extractive and 
low value-added sector for example, is a common characteristic within Latin American 
economies (Ocampo & Bértola, 2013). In the case of Mexico and Central American 
countries, the key issue is not so much the lack of industrial services, but the incapacity 
to go beyond mere low value-added production and avoid enclave economies, as is the 
case of maquilas in Mexico (Gallagher & Zarsky, 2007). There is evidence that points 
to causes similar to the ones this paper traces in the qualitative analysis, such as the lack 
of entrepreneurial spirit in the business class and the elimination of previous industrial 
policies from the State (Cypher & Delgado, 2011). The cases in South America are clos-
er to Chile’s, in the sense of the incapacity to deploy new exports beyond areas intensive 
in natural resources, particularly Peru or Bolivia which, as Chile, are highly dependent 
on extractive exports and do not have an important inward-looking industrial sector, as 
Argentina and Brazil. In these cases, some hypotheses have emerged, focused mostly 
on the rentier character of the extractive elites and their capacity to capture the State to 
avoid a demand for diversification (Bebbington et al., 2018). In that sense, this article 
can help to provide for new evidence to future comparative analyses that look at general 
tendencies in the region related to the causes of the lack of export diversification. 
The paper is divided as follows: after this introduction, the second section presents 
a literature review on the relation between elites and economic development, with 
particular reference to Chile. The third section reviews how services have become an 
important component of political discourse and public policies towards economic di-
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versification and development in Chile. The fourth section presents the methodology 
and results of this research. Finally, conclusions and some final remarks are presented. 
II. Elites and economic development: a literature review
One of the empirical facts of capitalism expansion during the ‘first globalisation’ (from 
the 19th century to the First World War) was that new wealth and productive capacities 
generated in Europe did not expand evenly across nations, but actually reinforced the 
unequal development of countries (Madisson, 2007; Williamson, 2009). This empiri-
cal fact opened the door, during the mid-20th century, for a series of economists to look 
at the causes of this inequality, putting attention on the main characteristics of under-
developed regions.
Nurkse (1961) identified two key elements that explained the ‘vicious circle of pov-
erty’ of underdeveloped regions: the low income derived from the export of natural re-
sources, on the one side; and the tendency of elite to replicate the pattern of consump-
tion of Western countries’ elite (‘demonstration effect’), on the other. This last element 
refers to a cultural tendency of economic elite in underdeveloped regions to ‘emulate’ 
the consumption patterns of elite from wealthy countries, thus spending huge amounts 
of saving on conspicuous consumption and not on productive investment. 
The key element in Nurkse’s account is that economic elite is culturally unable to 
deploy an entrepreneurial Schumpeterian function. If that was the case, the entrepre-
neurial role was to be assumed by the State that, through progressive tax reforms and 
a series of public investments, could mobilise resources towards the industrial sector.
As a clear expression of that ‘cultural’ perspective, the classic work of Rostow (1961) 
suggested that the main reason countries were unable to initiate a process of modern 
growth was the still predominant pre-capitalist institutions and, thus, the non-capital-
ist rationality of their respective elite. This reasoning was, in fact, the predominant ex-
planation until around the first half of the 20th century and had typical representatives 
in the classic works of Chile, Encina (1955) with a conservative approach and Jobet 
(1951) representing a socialist one. Both identified the economic and political elite of 
the 20th century as the main reason for Chile’s lack of economic industrialisation and 
associated this condition with the colonial influence and the pre-capitalist mentality, in 
a sharp contrast, according to them, to their peers in UK and the US.
However, the ‘cultural’ explanation was not the only one available in the classic de-
velopmentalist repertoire. According to Rosenstein-Rodan (1976), the reason that in 
underdeveloped regions capitalist elite were unable to develop a process of economic 
development was not cultural, but strictly economic in nature, as it assumed that the 
capitalist class is strictly guided by an economic profits maximization rational.
Underdeveloped regions have hidden developmental potential that is limited by a 
series of coordination problems (lack of public infrastructure, human capital, comple-
mentary investments, inputs suppliers, etc.) that cannot be assumed by the individual 
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profit-seeker capitalists: their interests as economic agents are to survive in the market 
through permanently increasing their private profit and reducing their private costs. 
Investing in public goods that could solve the coordination problem, for example, gen-
erates positive externalities that cannot be completely appropriated by the capitalists. 
Thus, even though the social return of those kind of investments can be high, their pri-
vate return is low, locking the economy into a less-than-optimal economic equilibri-
um. In this case, Rosenstein-Rodan considered the State as the institution that could 
assume those investment costs, precisely because it rationally goes beyond short-term 
profit and is able to assume the risks of those investments. 
Classical developmentalism was not the only approach to elaborate a critical view 
on the relationship between elite and (under)development. Latin American Structur-
alist school of thought also introduced key elements to this analysis. In fact, its key con-
tribution was to link the role of the elite not with their (in)capacity to overcome ‘market 
failures’, but to insert their interests and economic action horizons into the structural 
positions in which they were placed. 
For Prebisch (1981), along with a lack of ‘entrepreneurial spirit’, and in line with 
Nurkse’s approach, unproductive consumption patterns are a key element of peripheral 
countries’ economic elite, locking the economy into extractive and low value added sec-
tors (Ahumada, 2019). As the construction of an integrated free market tended to re-
produce core and periphery conditions (relegating Latin America to the specialisation 
in the export of natural resources and low value added manufactures), economic elite 
that could benefit from these conditions, generating comparative advantages, would 
protect this kind of integration, restricting the implementation of policies focused on 
the development of new industries and, therefore, the building a developmental pro-
ject. The peripheries’ elite was contrary to development because they defended their 
position derived from the global market’s international division of labour.
For the case of Chile, the works of Pinto and Véliz became clear representatives 
of this view. Pinto (1959) argued that while the US was able to initiate an industrial 
transformation through the victory of the bourgeois elite and its protectionists policies 
against ‘England’s free trade imperialism’, in the case of Chile the power bloc (landlords, 
traders and financiers) did not develop any clear interests towards overcoming Chile’s 
peripheral condition, passively adapting to the pressures from global trade for special-
ising in the static comparative advantages of natural resources. Véliz (1963) reinforced 
this view and indicated that the key problem of Chile’s economy during the 19th cen-
tury until the crisis of 1930 was the ‘free trade’ coalition, confining any non-marginal 
State involvement and protection, in order to safe their profitable (yet socially sub-opti-
mal) passive integration into the global market. The deepest historical analyses coming 
from this view for the Chilean case are Zetilin (1984), and Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1987). 
The first one suggested that Chile had different ‘Civil Wars’ (1851-61, 1891 and 1973) 
between a pro-development, industrialist and protective proto-industrial bourgeoisie, 
and a liberal, free-trade, extractive and financial elite. The results were an abortive in-
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dustrial development and the triumph of the most liberal elites, unable and unwilling 
to implement the series of protective policies necessary for building new comparative 
advantages beyond the ones ‘given’ by the world economy. The result was the consol-
idation of an elite power bloc established by capitalists focused on trade and finance 
together with a strong landlord class that shaped Chile’s economy towards passively 
accepting the world market’s pressure for specialisation in natural resources and trade 
activities, leaving manufactures and industrial production to the capitalist centres. 
The Dependency school deepened and radicalised this approach. For Frank (1967), 
the economic elite of peripheries is as rational as any capitalist class; their motives are 
strictly guided by modern profit-seeking rationality just as their Western peers. For him, 
the elite’s lack of an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ does not come from some colonial heritage 
or pre-capitalist and feudal rationality (as was assumed, implicitly or explicitly in the 
classical developmentalist and modernization approaches), but from the most capital-
ist-rational way to accumulate wealth in peripheries: resource extraction, finance and 
commerce, any of this able to spark a process of industrial capitalist accumulation. 
After the falling down of the Industrialization by Import Substitution (ISI) regime, 
classical developmentalism and structuralism began to be reconsidered by a new school 
vaguely defined as ‘neodevelopmentalism’ (Bresser-Pereira, 2019). This school based 
most of its analyses on the comparison between East Asian ‘economic miracle’ and the 
economic stagnation of both the ISI and liberal experiments of Africa and Latin Amer-
ica (see Kohli, 2012).
This school reproduced many of the argument for State involvement established 
by the classical developmentalist school. Market economies in peripheral societies de-
ployed a series of market failures that private capitalists were unable to integrate into 
their investment decisions. According to Fajnzylber (1983), capitalists in develop-
ing countries made investments, which while statically efficient (in terms of resource 
allocations under given technological and productive conditions), were inefficient 
in a dynamic way (unable to invest in new comparative advantages). The reason was 
straightforward: capitalists base their investment on the expectation of future profit, 
which means deciding between options according to the level of risk and short-term 
gains. In that sense, investing in new industries or higher value-added sectors, which 
went against the given signals of profits from the market, was, economically speaking, 
irrational. This ‘irrationality’ was explained as an outcome of both the immobility of 
their productive factors and the path dependency dynamics derived from their previ-
ous investments and the institutional inertia for Latin America see Schneider (2013), 
an example applied to the US can be found in Brenner (2006).
This literature suggested that the Asian example showed that a cohesive State with 
a strong bureaucracy implementing active industrial policies was the main ‘entrepre-
neurial agent’ in driving public and private resources towards dynamic efficient sectors 
beyond the market signals (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Kohli, 2004). While this type 
of State helped the capitalist elite to be Shumpeterian and explained the Asian success, 
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the absence and the predominance of the capitalist rentier elite power in the rest of the 
peripheral countries explained their failure to industrialise (Chibber, 2004; Kay, 2002; 
Evans, 1995)1.
In the case of Chile, a new heterodox literature concerning the limits of its contem-
porary productive structure has focused on two interconnected elements: the character 
of the economic elite and the lack of a proper State agenda towards productive develop-
ment. In relation to the first element, it has been pointed out that Chile’s economic elite 
can be characterised as rent-seeking as their main investment goes to the exploitation of 
natural resources (Ricardian rents), retail and commercial sectors (control of distribu-
tion areas) and the control of financial services (financial rents). These characteristics 
go together with low investments in R&D and technological upgrading, as high rents 
reduce the incentives for innovation (Ahumada, 2019).
In relation to the passive role of the government concerning productive develop-
ment, the predominance of a subsidiary ideology in the State has restricted the horizons 
for the implementation of industrial and trade policies that could support the emer-
gence of new comparative advantages in more knowledge-intensive areas (Guardia, 
2015; Taylor, 2008). This narrative restricts the State’s actions to just securing property 
rights and only directly intervening in economic areas when there are no previous pri-
vate businesses interested in investing. As these businesses tend to be risk-averse and 
rent-seekers, their predominance limits the capacity of the economy to diversify into 
more dynamic areas.
As recent empirical and theoretical discussions have shown, the rentier elite and 
the subsidiary character of the State are connected elements. Acemoglu & Robinson 
(2013) have stated that extractive economic institutions (that privilege rent seeking 
and reduce incentives for entrepreneurship) are path-dependent and lock in societies´ 
growth patterns into sub-optimal outcomes. This has been considered the result of the 
capacities of the extractive elite to use de facto political power (lobby, bribery, etc.) 
against the de jure power of, for example, contemporary democratic regimes. In that 
sense, even though a political system can be inclusive and democratic in formal terms, it 
perpetuates a series of informal extractive institutions in the economic order (Acemo-
glu & Robinson, 2008). For the case of Chile, González, Mounu & Urzúa (2018) have 
indicated that economic groups in Chile that emerged after the privatization process 
implemented during Pinochet’s regime were able to build strong de jure political power 
(political connections, financing campaigns, etc.) that perpetuated their power during 
democratic governments. This hypothesis has also been supported by Huneeus (2014), 
who identifies the causes of contemporary democratic deficit and the lack of economic 
1 Contemporary analyses on economic innovation in developed countries have reached similar conclusions. 
For Mazzucato (2013, 2018), the State has been behind key technological innovations in the United States 
through public investments in R&D and high-risk investments in novel inventions (2013). The business 
sector, on the contrary, has tended to appropriate the rents from these public-financed new technologies, 
through strong intellectual monopoly rents (Mazzucato, 2018).
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diversification in the path-dependent persistence of the institutions of the dictatorship 
actively supported by the economic elite.
III. Services as an alternative for economic diversification
Chile has identified the diversification of its economy, particularly its export matrix, as 
a priority, and the development of an export service industry one of its key objectives 
(ProChile, 2017). The prioritization of services as an economic sector that may boost 
Chile’s development has been justified due to the evidence pointed out by empirical 
research considering that added value incorporated in some exports services boosts 
economic growth, a necessary condition for development (Adlung, 2007; Deardorff, 
2001; Deardorff & Stern, 2008; Mattoo, Rathindran, & Subramanian, 2006; Riddle, 
1986; UNCTAD, 2016). 
The literature has identified different transmission channels in which trade in servic-
es affects economic growth and therefore, development (López et al., 2017). First, trade 
liberalization improves services performance and productivity (see Borchert, Gootiiz, 
Grover, & Mattoo, 2015; Cali, Ellis & Willemte, 2008; Eschenbach & Hoeckman, 2006; 
Francois & Hoekman, 2010). Second, we must consider that services openness impact 
on economic growth varies between countries, according to their economic develop-
ment stages (Wölfl, 2005). Services added value is positively correlated to per capita 
income levels (Francois & Reinert, 1996), but this is dependent on the performance 
of opening markets implementation. Trade openness may improve competition and 
productivity in domestic services sectors, increasing their export likelihood, and having 
positive effects on manufactures and labour productivity (López et al., 2017). 
As stated by Devlin & Moguillansky (2011), services (and trade in services) are in-
strumental for the development of global value chain (GVC), particularly telecommu-
nications and transport. Service expansion opens new trade opportunities for firms, in 
a context of an intensive competition among them to participate in GVC, considering 
that global offshoring (particularly of services) has become a relevant part of produc-
tion relocation and fragmentation (DIRECON, 2015).
The absence of an active export promotion in non-traditional sectors tends to con-
centrate them in few firms and in products with a less dynamic demand, which has 
increased the interest to understand how trade promotion may boost services exports 
(Cali, Ellis, & Williem, 2008; Mattoo & Payton, 2007; OCDE, 2005). Export promo-
tion policies complement trade liberalization and macroeconomic stability2 as they are 
directed to help exporters to overcome sectoral barriers and react in a proper way to 
price or other markets signals (Agosin, 1997). As the capability to export services is de-
2 Common instruments for promotion of trade in services include: trade openness and trade agreements; 
markets exploration and trade intelligence; capacity building; clusters programs; associativity; subsidies, tax 
relief and regulatory support; trade finance schemes; exchange rate policies; and investment attraction. 
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termined by the interplay of endowments, institutions and infrastructure (López et al., 
2017), a services strategy demands to link institutions and instruments with the design 
of short and long term scenarios that allow the creation of new comparative advantages 
(Lin & Chang, 2009). Some preconditions for successful policies towards the promo-
tion of a services industry include: levelling playing field and enabling competition; b) 
warranty of services quality; c) protection of consumers and guaranty transparency; d) 
protection of the environment; and e) guaranteed  access to services (Cali et al., 2008).
Chile has based services export promotion support mainly in two Ministries: For-
eign Affairs and Economy. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DIRECON (renamed 
as Undersecretary of International Economic Relations), the agency responsible for 
Chile´s international economic relations and trade negotiations, and due to the rele-
vance of services within international negotiations, opened a specialized department 
on services, investment and air transport. This Department has been complemented 
with the inclusion of a Digital Economy program. Second, ProChile, the export promo-
tion agency established a services department in 2004 in charge of designing and imple-
menting strategies and programs with the aim of internationalization of this sector. At 
the Ministry of Economy, CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción), agency 
created to enhance national productive activity oriented to create industrial capacity, 
included services export development in their work agenda, as included in the Clusters 
Program during President Bachelet first government. The Finance Ministry also started 
to get involved in facilitation of trade in services through reforms and projects within 
the customs service, the internal revenue service and the foreign investment attraction 
office, which have begun to get awareness of the importance of services exports (López 
et al., 2017).
Taking into consideration that during the examined period the dominant policy par-
adigm was a neutral approach towards industrial development, we have identified three 
main policies implemented for the development of the export services industry: first, 
trade openness, which has become the most important instrument and base of national 
economic policy; then, since Bachelet´s first government sectoral brands and the clus-
ter policies have been also implemented. These will be the main policies which will be 
then analysed in the interviews. 
Trade Openness: Due to the political decision of non-State intervention in the eco-
nomic system, Chilean administration has worked toward the achievement of free mar-
kets to enhance the development of any industry including services through competi-
tion. In this context, trade openness becomes fundamental for economic policy, as it 
allows for international competition within the domestic market, and ensures (through 
agreements) fair competition in foreign markets. Services become part of these strat-
egies, particularly after their inclusion in the GATT`s Uruguay Round, and the estab-
lishment of the WTO GATS in 1995 (López et al., 2017). Since the FTA with Canada 
(1996), including services in negotiations agendas has become an important condition 
for Chile. Currently, out of 28 trade agreements in force, 19 contain provisions related 
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to trade in services. To complement markets access gained through FTAs, Chile has 
also signed investment and double taxation agreements. 
Sectoral Brands: Aimed to support the international branding of Chilean products, 
the program was first implemented by CORFO. It expected that through collabora-
tive work of international positioning, it would contribute to the expansion of sectoral 
industries exports and the construction of a Chilean brand abroad. In 2011, it was in-
corporated into ProChile, in order to strengthen State support for the international-
ization of companies and productive sectors, by taking advantage of the institution’s 
experience in exports promotion, knowledge of the markets and its wide international 
network (López et al., 2017). ProChile undertakes to co-finance up to 60% of annual 
activities with no ceiling. The program is open on an ongoing basis to applications from 
any sector, therefore the selection criteria are based on actual applications and do not 
reflect a strategy from the government to choose specific economic sectors. Since the 
inception of the program, 19 sectoral brands have been created, based on both goods 
and services. 
Global services cluster: During Bachelet´s first term in office, the National Inno-
vation Council for Competitiveness (CNIC) defined the National Innovation Strategy 
for competitiveness, with a view to doubling GDP per capita by 2020. Using a diagnosis 
made by the international consultant firm Boston Consulting Group in 20073, a Global 
Services Cluster was installed by the end of 2007. Most actions took place in 2008 and 
2009, including prospective field trips to potential export markets and capacity build-
ing programs. During 2010, under the administration of President Piñera, CORFO de-
fined non-selectivity as a management criterion and reformulated the cluster program, 
in order to support private sector initiatives in a neutral way (López et al., 2017). 
IV. Research methods and Results
Data collection, sample and limitations
For this study, we employed a qualitative methodological approach to get an in-depth 
understanding of the perspectives of the role of elite and the State in the development 
of the services export sector in Chile. For this purpose, in-depth semi structured inter-
views were conducted.4 In order to establish the representative sample for these inter-
views, we followed Malterud, Siersma, and Guassora (2016) approach on the informa-
tion power of the sample, which relies on the information that could be extracted from 
selected interviewees. Hence, the selection criteria were based on the aim of the study, 
sample specificity, established theories, quality of dialogue, and analysis strategy. To 
3 BCG was hired to elaborate a “Cluster Competitiveness Study of the Chilean Economy”, resulting in five 
clusters for the sectors with the greatest growth potential in the medium and long term: food, mining, special 
interest tourism, aquaculture and offshoring services.
4 Interview questionnaire guideline is presented in Annex 1.
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maximize the information power of the sample, we took a two-step identification pro-
cess of key stakeholders. First, we identified the main organizations representing busi-
ness and State elite related to economic development in Chile, with particular attention 
to services industry. Second, amongst those organizations, we identified which actors 
hold key positions during the examined period, forming a preliminary list of stakehold-
ers to be interviewed. Fieldwork was conducted between May 2014 and September 
2018 until we established that we had reached a “saturation point” (Glaser & Strauss, 
1999). 
An initial sample of over 50 stakeholders representative of the different elites were 
identified and  approached by email and phone in order to invite them to participate 
in this study. Each potential interviewee was informed about voluntary participation in 
the study; they were told that confidentiality of their identities would be assured; results 
were going to be published anonymously; and interviews would last around 60 minutes. 
Each participant was asked for their Informed Consent before the interview began. In-
terviews were conducted at participants’ offices by two researchers and were recorded 
with the participants’ permission. All data was de-identified and coded, assigned accord-
ing to their occupational sector and used for research purposes exclusively.
A total of 53 interviews were conducted during fieldwork, descriptive statistics of 
the sample are presented in Table 1. Rejection to participate in the study was insignifi-
cant. In order to categorize the participants regarding the sector they represent, and due 
to the long period examined, we selected the most important position they held. This 
is relevant, as some stakeholders have moved from public to private sector or academia, 
particularly during government changes. This classification was established in accord-
ance with the interviewees, who were informed of the position in which their responses 
would be classified, hence they were asked to answer according to the position in which 
they had been classified.5 This approach was established to narrow the aim and dialogue 
scope in order to maximize the information power derived from each interview.  
Although representatives of all sectors have been interviewed, the sample may seem 
to have a bias towards public sector officials. This may be explained by the access to key 
stakeholders available to answer our questions, and the need to understand not only the 
role of economic elite, but why the various administrations did not design nor used more 
aggressive strategies, although there was awareness that the country’s export and pro-
duction baskets lack of complexity was insufficient to achieve better jobs, greater equity 
and improve individuals’ life quality (López et al., 2017). Together with this, we must 
state that representatives from private sector are much more stable than those from pub-
5  Regarding public sector, high-level officials included ministers in different governments (Foreign Affairs, 
Treasury, Economy and Agriculture), vice-presidents of CORFO, and directors of DIRECON and ProChile. 
Mid-level officials included department heads from DIRECON, CORFO, Treasury Ministry, Customs and 
Agriculture. Regarding the private sector, we have split our sample into two categories: the stakeholders 
from individual firms, and actors belonging to business chambers and private associations. Finally, part of the 
sample corresponds to stakeholders from the academia, NGOs and international organizations. 
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lic sector being in office for longer periods of time. Nevertheless, little discrepancy was 
found amongst interviewees, particularly when classified according to their sector. 
TABLE 1. Sample demographics (n = 53)
Demographics N Percentage 
Gender 
    Male 
    Female
 
40 
13
 
75.5% 
24.5%
Sector 
    Public 
        High-level officials 
        Mid-level officials
    Private 
        Chambers 
        Companies
    Academia / International Organizations
 
28 
12 
16
11 
6 
5
12
 
52.8% 
22.6% 
30.18%
20.75% 
11.3% 
9.4%
22.6%
Nationality 
    Chilean 
    Foreigner
 
49 
4
 
92.4% 
7.5%
Total 53 100%
With the information gathered, we conclude that with the given interviews we had 
arrived at a data saturation point (Malterud et al., 2016), as no new evidence was added 
by the last interviewees, and the depth of the gathered information proved to be suffi-
cient to answer our research question (Mason, 2010; Fusch & Ness, 2015). 
Results
In this section, the results from the qualitative analysis based on the interviews with key 
stakeholders are presented. Interviews analysed stakeholders’ perceptions on the Chile-
an economic development model, focusing on corporate, institutional and even cultur-
al ideological aspects. More specifically, the questions referred to the (im) possibility of 
meeting a goal such as the development of an international competitive services sector. 
Although the interviews were focused on the (under)development of export services, 
most stakeholders’ answers referred to a general economic environment which does 
not create the conditions for the development of any value-added activity.
The premises that we tested were the perception amongst stakeholders that, since 
the late 70s, there has been an absence of any State policy to promote service export, 
which is in line with the given neoliberal economic Chilean model, and the lack of a 
business elite with the essential characteristics to modify the export matrix, such as 
high creative capacities and low risk aversion to add value, as Schumpeter considered is 
needed for capitalism advance. 
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These two premises derive from the perception that the neutrality State approach 
to the productive sphere implemented in Chile demanded a different business elite in 
order to modify the export matrix to a more complex composition, such as one based 
on services. The existing business elite marked by rentier characteristics do not have the 
entrepreneurial spirit needed for this kind of changes. Therefore, although the produc-
tive development policy was to ensure market conditions to warrant perfect competi-
tion which will allow business elite to have the conditions to develop a complex export 
sector, it simply kept the pre-existing industry model. Nevertheless, the continuity of 
the economic model implemented during the military regime became a sort of “norma-
tive law”, due to the desire of keeping peace and governance at a particular moment in 
recent Chilean history when it was needed to achieve a peaceful democratic transition. 
As mentioned by an academic stakeholder, “the rest of Latin America had severe hyper-
inflation and economic disorder when exiting from authoritarian regimes. Chile had 
to demonstrate that we were capable of ensuring governance without the military in 
command”. During the first years of democracy, not changing the economic model was 
considered a condition for political stability.
Chilean business elite is the result of geographical conditions, their participation 
in the economic model, and the surviving capacity after the dictatorship period. Ac-
cording to a high-level public official, “the existing entrepreneurial culture or spirit was 
restricted for reasons of cultural and historical class formation, in neo-rentier forms, 
by climate, latitude and even by geography”. They also share Nurske’s critique of the 
‘demonstration effect’ of elite (1961), spending huge amounts of saving in consump-
tion instead of productive investment. They do not behave as traditional capitalists and 
are not prepared to undertake the risk associated with profitability. Chilean economy 
continued to be dependent on an elite power bloc constituted by capitalists focused on 
commerce and finance and a strong property owner class. There were no incentives to 
change the pre-existing economic conditions, which based economic empowerment in 
rent-seeking from monopolistic position or natural resources exploitation.
For the literature considered here, business risk-taking attitude is essential for ser-
vice industry development. As exposed by the interviewees, complex non-rentier forms 
of productive operations are viewed with precaution in Chile. The national entrepre-
neur demands certainty and rational risk management. As stated by a high-level public 
official, “the business sector is very comfortable. It seeks mainly regulatory changes and 
elements related to labour issues. The same happens with the private associations”. The 
main problem lies in the characteristics of the Chilean business elite, particularly their 
rent-seeking characteristics. The case of the rentier element, as expressed by an aca-
demic, “would respond to the presence of factors associated with a society that lives off 
the exploitation of its natural resources and does not develop capitalism”. The general 
view is that elite is a more fearful and less risky group, particularly in Chile, where elite 
is small, isolated and used to agreeing amongst them, tending to reproduce existing 
productive structures.
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In a country like Chile, rich in natural resources and with little State regulation over 
them, the expected tendency is an irrational exploitation of primary goods, not the in-
vestment in services trade opportunities. This idea is confirmed by actors from differ-
ent sectors, who define it as a non-capitalist rationality that has been developed based 
on the exploitation of natural resources. Representatives of academia mention that “it 
would respond to the presence of factors associated with a society that lives off the ex-
ploitation of its natural resources and does not develop capitalism”. This idea is shared 
by business leaders, but taking into consideration that if natural resources are available, 
it is not a fault to develop an industry based on their extraction, but the country´s eco-
nomic advantage. In that sense, it is considered by business as a completely capitalist 
rationality, the specialization in low value added natural resources exploitation. Regard-
less of the difference in interpretation, both perspectives share the incapacity of the 
capitalist elite to develop a Schumpeterian entrepreneur.
This kind of economic development is largely reinforced by the lack of State regu-
lations. As mentioned by various stakeholders, “In Chile, firms have very low social re-
sponsibilities to extract natural resources, and no obligation to innovate or add value… 
…We have an elite which will only do business that is secured. They minimize risk and 
are not interested in a more egalitarian society. They have had a logic that maximizes the 
individual over the social”. This is considered as an overall dynamic that is expressed in 
the sectoral level (i.e. service) as an incapacity of these agents to create any exportable 
services that would require new investment and a longer-term benefit return. 
In order to explain these characteristics,  two justifications were identified within 
the responses of the interviewees: one coming from private sector and other from gov-
ernment officials. The first inclined their answers towards a business sector that oper-
ates with a profit maximizing logic, having to deal with a rapid international economic 
insertion. “Entrepreneurs are called rentiers only because they like to earn money. And 
if they do it by exploiting natural resources and nobody regulates or prohibits them, 
why should they make efforts in another direction?” states a business representative.
The second group emphasizes the lack of interest in changing the status-quo under 
which business elite have developed their businesses, but acknowledging the low gov-
ernmental support they face to move into services. A high-level official proposes that 
there are “few incentives to innovate, insufficient and uncertain, which also contributes 
to the low entrepreneurial attitude of the private sector”. This is complemented by a 
feeling that “privatizations, the contraction of CORFO, the dissemination of the ini-
tiatives to promote exports, the small size of the State with non-regulatory schemes, 
reduced innovative culture”. Therefore, an accommodated business elite which does not 
innovate, together with a State incapable to implement strong development promotion 
policies towards services, explains the failure to build an alternative economic sector 
within export services.
This elite is also perceived as reluctant to develop the necessary attributes to insert 
themselves in international trade in services. For example, a business representative 
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states that having to “be certified so that your product can enter the markets, in a world 
that is guided by certifications as the services, has been a problem for the firms”. This 
is complemented by the perception of high-level public officials which states that “they 
prefer buying the foreign technology to investing in research or certification processes”.
As evidence, most of the Chilean successful companies when reaching a size when 
they need to develop new strategies to continue in business prefer to sell their firm to 
large transnational corporations; this was the case of local engineering firms like CADE 
or ARCADIS. This is the short-term vision, which is explained by business owners as 
part of the Chilean market size, where “successful ventures end up being bought by for-
eigners, and that is where the strategy is changed”. This means that it is easier to import 
services than to create them on your own with the investment and risk association.
The business elite is perceived as very different from those of Asian economies; they 
are less entrepreneurial and more traditionally rentiers and landowners than in many 
of the Latin-American countries. This would be the main difference from the Asian 
countries which has been documented as opposed to the business essence of the Latin 
American countries: a risk-taking essence (Palma, 2011). This opinion is shared at the 
different stakeholders’ clusters. Nevertheless, a business chamber representative stated 
that “entrepreneurs, for example, the Koreans, have very different and closest links with 
the State, they always count on it to protect and help them in other markets, something 
that services often need”, taking into consideration the need of public-private partner-
ships towards the development of new economic sectors.  
State institutions responsible for services sector consider that to the extent of their 
restrictions, they have reacted permanently to the demands placed by the business sec-
tor. They point out that because of their heterogeneity and difference in firms’ size in 
services, there is a serious problem in companies’ ability to associate. Currently, the 
literature sustains that associativity is essential to develop a strong service sector, and 
therefore this incapability will come a handicap in the possibility of developing this 
kind of industry in Chile.
A conclusion is that services exports are not an objective or even a desirable posi-
tive externality for these elites, which emerged from an economic model based on the 
extraction of natural resources and monopoly rents. In fact, the new business elite after 
the military regime are inherently risk-averse rentiers, and the State has not developed 
the incentives or regulations that could provide capacities and incentives to build a ser-
vices export sector. As an academic expert indicated, “ the current productive export 
matrix  (intensive in copper and agroindustry with low added value, and not in servic-
es) is the result of a lack of consistency, resources and will”.  
Finally, when stakeholders were consulted about the future, we found a general con-
sensus towards the need to implement more active and selective policies. As pointed 
out by one interviewee, the lack of industrial policies is product of “a fearful society, a 
conservative business class and a State reduced to a minimum”. Currently, the country 
is in a productive steady-state, and in order to change it, actions and policies need to be 
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TABLE 2. Main ideas from the perception of the business elite (BE) characteristics about its 
participation in the export matrix composition
HIGH LEVEL 
OFFICIALS
•	 There	is	an	absence	of	nationalist	business	elite	(BE)	in	Chile.	
•	 The	conservative	attitude	of	the	elite,	which	prefers	to	maintain	the	status	
quo, exploiting natural resources.
•	 The	BE	seeks,	most	of	the	time,	for	regulatory	reforms	or	labour	conditions	
modification but not for big transformations or State participation.
•	 The	main	characteristic	of	BE	is	to	pursue	profits	just	from	exploiting	natural	
resources, which is perceived as a neo-rentier elite.
•	 The	few	incentives	in	Chile	for	BE	to	innovate	are	insufficient	and	uncertain,	
which also contributes to the low entrepreneurial attitude of private sector.
•	 They	prefer	buying	the	foreign	technology	to	investing	in	any	investigation;	
certification is like taking risks.
MID LEVEL 
OFFICIALS
•	 The	business	elite	should	be	responsible	for	adding	value	to	their	production	
in order to modify the export matrix.
•	 The	State	strategies	for	services	exports	support	are	better	in	some	Asian	
countries than in Chile.
•	 The	Chilean	elites	are	small,	isolated	and	used	to	agreeing	amongst	them,	
which tends to reproduce their productive structures.
•	 The	business	does	not	have	access	to	finance	to	export	services.
PRIVATE 
SECTOR: 
COMPANIES
•	 The	BE	behaves	as	expected,	as	profit	maximization	agents.
•	 The	big	Chilean	firms	have	been	at	the	level	of	any	company,	there	are	big	
services exporters as retail companies. 
•	 The	BE	does	not	have	any	support,	and	for	the	SMEs	it	is	impossible	to	get	
into other markets alone.
PRIVATE 
SECTOR: 
CHAMBERS
•	 The	business	elite	acts	over	guaranteed	business.	They	minimize	risk.
•	 The	conventional	elite	do	not	risk	capital,	and	services	are	highly	intensive	on	
it to develop.
•	 The	BE	does	not	like	to	be	certified,	in	a	world	that	is	guided	by	certifications	
as the services.
•	 The	small	size	of	the	Chilean	market	has	effect	in	the	low	services	production	
that can take you to export them.
•	 The	BE	successful	ventures	end	up	being	bought	by	foreigners,	and	that	is	
where the strategy is changed.
ACADEMIA/ 
INTER. ORG.
•	 In	Chile	there	is	transplanted	elite,	meaning	that	they	do	not	have	strong	link-
ages with Chile.
•	 The	BE	has	high	consumption	patterns,	they	are	not	investors.
•	 The	BE	lacks	any	entrepreneurial	spirit.	Military	period	destroyed	the	entre-
preneurial spirit.
•	 The	Chilean	elite	is	not	the	one	you	define	as	Schumpeterian	capitalist	elite.
•	 The	BE	maximizes	the	individual	benefits	over	the	social	ones.
•	 In	Chile,	the	firms	have	very	low	social	responsibilities	to	extract	natural	re-
sources, and no obligation to innovate or add value. The State regulation does 
not consider this issue.
•	 The	BE	has	enough	profits	with	natural	resources	exploitation,	they	do	not	
have to modify their production to compete or to maintain their profits. They 
rent from natural resources.
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pushed. Particularly, there is a need to reinforce Chilean business class entrepreneur-
ship to promote economic development. “Chileans stopped being entrepreneur, and if 
it does not recover it, we will not develop”. 
A summary of the collected perceptions, organized according to the respective sec-
tor is presented in Table 2.
VI. Final Remarks
During the last decades, Chile´s economic growth has relied on the extraction of nat-
ural resources, which has led to different public agents to demand the emergence of 
new economic sectors and the diversification of its productive and export baskets. In 
this context, the development of a service export industry has become one of the main 
sectors identified by the State to be promoted. Although public policies towards this 
objective have been implemented, they have not been successful. 
In this paper, we suggest that the key Chilean stakeholder agents share a common 
view about the causes of the persistence of a natural resource-based economy that has 
been unable to diversify towards services. From our research, it is possible to detect a 
consensus concerning the behaviour and rationality of the business elite and its link 
with economic development in general, and service investments in particular. As stated 
by government representatives, the ‘rentier’ attitude of Chilean business class is derived 
from ‘natural protectionism’ (natural resources) and lack of entrepreneurial ‘culture’. 
Business representatives explain that their lack of capacity to diversify their investments 
is a direct consequence of their profit-maximization logic: if their relative gains in the 
global market are in natural resources and low value-added goods, the economic ra-
tionality would make them invest in those areas. In that sense, their position resembles 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s argument regarding the incapacity of business in underdeveloped 
countries to assume rationality beyond the market signals and the short-term benefits.
The rentier characteristic of the business elite is aggravated by the Chilean State neo-
liberal hegemony. This has been affirmed by government representatives, who refer that 
this economic thought has tended to take the state out from any kind of industrial pol-
icy that goes beyond soft horizontal measures or, recently, comparative advantage-fol-
lowing clusters. The Chilean State does not have a strong institutional body to provide 
incentives to firms to diversify their export basket. 
Together, both dynamics restrict the capacity of the country to advance in a novel 
path towards service industry and lock in the economy into an extractive, low value 
added and short-term pattern of economic growth. The business elite have no incen-
tives to move away from their current production patterns, as those patterns maximise 
their profits, therefore, if new economic sectors (with higher added value) arise, the 
need of a strong State capable of developing and implementing policies towards them 
will arise. But if a neoliberal conception of the State continues, there will be no place for 
the necessary policies to be implemented.
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The stakeholders’ narrative and hypothesis about Chile’s lack of diversification and 
economic lock-in go in consonance with the contemporary literature on development 
and its preconditions. As shown in the literature review, economic development implies 
a Schumpeterian process of innovation and knowledge production that requires the 
collaborative effort of both capitalists with long-term goals and low levels of risk-aver-
sion and an efficient and cohesive entrepreneurial state. Without those preconditions, 
the literature would suggest, growth will tend to stagnate and lock into economic sec-
tors with low dynamism. 
This main narrative among stakeholders is relevant since it is counter-intuitive to 
what a researcher would expect. Traditionally, political and economic elites tend to be 
complacent and optimistic about the economic model in which they have vested inter-
ests. However, regardless of the different causes they identify, all the stakeholders share 
a critical view about the role of elite and the incapacity of the state of economic regime 
to diversify and develop. 
This finding opens the door for more questions to be raised. How can an economic 
order maintain its inertia when the political, academic and private elites recognize their 
own short-termism passive role? This should be the next step of this line of research. 
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Annex 1. Interview Questionnaire guide6
1. According to your knowledge, what´s been the base of the Chilean economic development 
strategy implemented since the 1990s?
2. Could you identify the main axis of this strategy?
3. Regarding this strategy, which would be the main differences between presidential periods 
regarding the formulation and implementation of policies for its consecution?
4. How would you describe the participation of business and political elites within this strat-
egy?
5. Which were in your personal understanding the main policies and instruments implement-
ed to achieve the economic development? Do you think this were successful?
6. Do you think export basket diversification is a pre-condition to achieve a higher develop-
ment level? If so, why do you think Chile has not been capable to achieve this level?
7. Which countries do you think had been successful in the diversification and value-adding of 
their export baskets? Why? Which policies have they implemented?
8. With which other economic development process could we compare the Chilean case?
9. Regarding services, which strategies focused on the promotion of a services export industry 
could you identify?
10. To your personal understanding, which public programs aimed at the promotion of a ser-
vices export sector have been more relevant?
11. Could you identify both public and private institutions involved in this process?
12. How would you grade the services cluster program?
13. How would you grade the trade openness policy and its impact on services export? How 
relevant are double taxation agreements within this policy?
14. Regarding their participation in the promotion of services exports, how would you grade 
the following institutions:
a. ProChile 
b. Corfo 
c. Santiago Chamber of Commerce 
d. Banco del Estado (State Bank) 
e. Private financial system
f. ACTI 
g. SOFOFA
6  This is an open questionnaire; hence, questions and topics expressed in the guideline were used to guide the 
conversation with the interviewees. Researchers engaged in active conversation deepened some topics as the 
interview was carried out. Each question was conceived as a starting point to understand a specific aspect of 
our research.
